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Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private Contracting
Wendy Netter Epstein*
The market for public-private contracting is huge and flawed.
Privatization proponents predict that privatizing will both cut costs and
improve service quality. But public-private contracts for services such as
prisons and welfare administration tend to result in cost savings at the
sacrifice of quality service. For instance, to cut costs, private prisons skimp
on security. Public law scholars have studied these problems for decades
and have proposed various public law solutions. But the literature is
incomplete because it does not approach the problem through a commercial
lens. This Article fills that gap by applying contract theory principles to
public-private contracting.
It argues that certain categories of public-private contracts are
subject to systematic biases that cause the parties to impose a cost on
service recipients in the form of low quality service. Because there is a
limited competitive market for these services, the contracting parties are not
forced to internalize these costs. As a result, contracts tend to be
underpriced. Thus, what appears to be a cost-saving mechanism is often, in
fact, a systematic market failure.
This Article proposes a counterintuitive solution grounded in
contract theory and doctrine to force the parties to internalize the cost of
poor service provision. It suggests reading into public-private contracts a
mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest. Although
efficiency theory assumes that mandatory restrictions on contracting parties
are inefficient, a mandatory rule is justified, here, because the law must
protect non-parties to the contract who cannot adequately protect
themselves. The Article also suggests that third-party service beneficiaries
should be permitted to sue to enforce such contracts.
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INTRODUCTION
Public-private contracting is big business. Over a quarter of local
government services are now provided to some degree by private entities.1
And state governments’ use of privatization is on the rise.2 While most
sectors of the economy have struggled since 2008, government contracting
is seeing growth rates in the double digits.3 Governments now contract with
private companies to run public schools,4 operate prisons,5 place foster
children,6 administer welfare benefits,7 and provide military services8 and
1

See Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Cooperative Competition: Alternative Service
Delivery, 2002–2007, The Mun. Y.B. 11, 14 (2009) (reporting private entities responsible
for more than 25% of local or municipal service delivery).
2
There is a dearth of empirical evidence on trends in state-level privatization, but some
studies have indicated increased privatization. See, e.g., John D. Donahue, The
Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and Distortions, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 47-48 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009)
[hereinafter GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT] (citing a study by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis from 1950 through 2005, and noting that “[s]tate and local outsourcing starts low
and grows steadily but modestly.”); William M. Bulkeley, Glitches Mar Indiana's Effort to
Outsource Social Services, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL A4 (August 12, 2009) (citing
report finding “state-government outsourcing business will amount to about $8.8 billion in
revenue this year, and predict[ing] it will grow 5% annually to $11.2 billion in 2014.”).
There is a wealth of anecdotal evidence that state-level privatization is increasing. See,
e.g., Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 8
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (“the clear trend over the last few decades, at
all levels of government, is toward outsourcing.”); E.S. Savas, Privatization in State and
Local Government, in RESTRUCTURING STATE AND LOCAL SERVICES: IDEAS, PROPOSALS,
AND EXPERIMENTS 91 (Arnold H. Raphaelson ed., Greenwood Publishing Group 1998)
(“Privatization of state and local government services is widespread and growing.”); III. A
Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1868 (2002) (“Private prisons are on the rise.”).
3
The State of the Government Contractor Industry: 2010 (published by Grant Thorton
2010), available at
http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Government%20contractors/Government%20contra
ctor%20files/GovConRdtble2010FINALpdf.pdf (in 2009, government contracting industry
grew 12% over the past year); see also GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 6
(“During fiscal year 2006, federal agencies spent over $400 billion on procurement of
goods and services from private firms, an increase of almost 90 percent since 2000.”).
4
Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private[ized] Entities, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1726 (2002).
5
Id.; Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 155, 160–63
(2000) [hereinafter The Contracting State]; Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of
Constitutional Liability on the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52
VAND. L. REV. 489, 494 (1999).
6
Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 665, 670 n.9 (2007).
7
Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1739, 1740 (2002) (discussing the privatization of Florida’s public assistance
program for needy families).
8
Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84
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border control,9 among myriad other examples. Public-private contracting
has continued to gain favor during the recent recession in part as an answer
to state budgetary problems.10
The attractiveness and success of privatization11 derive from its
presumed ability to reduce the costs of providing government services while
maintaining or ideally improving quality. Yet time has shown that
government efforts to save costs, for certain types of contracts, often come
at the expense of service quality.12 For instance, New Jersey contracted
with a private company to run halfway houses for the state. The fee to
house an inmate in a private halfway house is half what it costs to keep an
inmate in a state prison.13 But to cut costs and maximize profits, private
companies skimp on security and inmates regularly escape and commit
further violent crimes, or are raped or killed at private halfway houses.14
In another example, IBM entered into a $1.34 billion, ten-year deal
with the state of Indiana to administer public benefits programs. 15 The deal
was supposed to save Indiana $500 million,16 but the contract collapsed in
2009.17 Beneficiaries now allege that, because IBM wrongly denied
Medicaid benefits or caused lapses in benefits, they were unable to buy
crucial medications or receive life-sustaining medical procedures.18 One
mother even claims that after her son was wrongly denied benefits and
could not afford his anti-psychotic medication, he gouged her eyes out in a
schizophrenic fit. 19 These examples are not isolated.20
N.C. L. REV. 397, 436–37 (2006).
9
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 2.
10
Outsourcing helps states address budgetary issues through cost-savings and sometimes in
delaying payments. See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1965 (2011) (discussing Chicago’s decision to lease its parking meters).
11
The terms “public-private contracting,” “government outsourcing,” “privatizing,” and
“contracting out,” mean different things in different contexts. But for purposes of this
Article, they are used interchangeably to indicate a contract between a governmental entity
and a private party, where the private party agrees to provide a government service for the
benefit of the public in exchange for compensation by the government.
12
This Article does not suggest that these agreements always fail. Undoubtedly, there are
successes. It simply suggests ways that contract law can ameliorate the most common
causes of the failures.
13
Sam Dolnick, At A Halfway House, Bedlam Reigns, NEWYORKTIMES.COM (June 17,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/at-bo-robinson-a-halfway-house-innew-jersey-bedlam-reigns.html?_r=1&smid=fb-share.
14
Id.
15
See Bulkeley, supra note 2 at A4.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See Gibson v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 1:10-CV-00330-LJM, 2011 WL 4402599 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 22, 2011).
19
Land v. Int'l Bus. Machines, Inc., 11-3450, 2012 WL 2355590 (7th Cir. June 21, 2012)
(affirming dismissal of claims because “[a]lthough there is no denying that Land suffered a
wrong, it is not one for which federal law provides a remedy).
20
See Part I(C), infra.
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Indeed, public-private contracting is a pervasive endeavor that has
attracted much scholarly attention from public law scholars in recent
decades.21 For instance, Martha Minow and Jody Freeman recently
suggested that:
Our current government contracting system does not work. It
is largely invisible and unresponsive to the public in whose
name it is undertaken. The existing rules and procedures fail
to guard adequately against inefficiency, conflict of interest,
and abuse. And much of the power being exercised through
contracting is largely unaccountable to any regime of
oversight – market, legal, or political.22
In general, public law scholars focus on problems of democratic process
and accountability and propose various administrative law and Constitutionbased solutions to public-private contracting problems.23 The prevailing
sentiment in the academic literature is that private, profit-maximizing firms
should not be entrusted with providing government services absent
safeguards because profit-maximizing goals conflict with public service
values. Nonetheless, privatization continues.
Public law scholars have made important contributions to the
literature, but their arguments are incomplete because they do not consider
the problem through a commercial—or more specifically a contract
theory—lens.24 Commercial law scholars, for their part, have largely
21

For a thorough account of the existing privatization literature, see Chris Sagers, The
Myth of “Privatization,” 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 42-56 (2007). See also supra notes 4-8;
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 2; Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations,
Due Process, and the Duty To Supervise, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2, at
291; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law,
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2, at 261; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law
Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1317–20, 1342 (2003) [hereinafter
Extending Public Law Norms]; Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of
Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 641–42 (2001) [hereinafter Privatized Welfare];
Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389 (2003); Janna J.
Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Government Contracting, 112
YALE L.J. 2465, 2475 (2003); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1267 (2003); Dru Stevenson,
Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
83, 127-128 (2003).
22
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 20.
23
Id.
24
Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The
Case of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 263, 279 (2006) (promoting the use of
relational contract methods in public-private contracting); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in
the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 293–95 (1995) (arguing
that restrictive contract doctrines should be used to preclude enforcement of socially costly
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ignored public-private contracting, focusing instead on commercial
interactions between firms or contracts between individuals.25 This Article
bridges the gap between public and commercial law in the universe of
public-private contracting by considering how economic analysis of
contract law26 bears upon the unique problems of public-private contracting.
It argues that certain types of public-private contracts do not function like
standard commercial agreements and the law (and the contracting parties)
should recognize this.
First, the government lacks the proper incentives to ensure high
quality service provision. This is particularly true where the service in
question “benefits” the disenfranchised in society such as criminals and the
poor who have no economic power (as a commercial customer would) and
limited political power. Also, budget and resource pressure often account
for the decision to outsource in the first place, meaning that governments
are likely (and sometimes obligated) to accept the lowest bid for a project
without regard to quality. These problems are likely to be worse in publicprivate contracting than direct service provision because by outsourcing,
governments buy the right to point the finger at the private party if service
provision is poor. Also, private actors may be motivated by profit
maximization goals more so than government workers providing the same
services.27
Second, even if the government were incentivized to provide high
quality service, it faces systematic difficulties in doing so. Although
advocates of privatization herald the move from state-run monopoly to a
contracts).
25
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 619 (2003) [hereinafter Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law].
26
This Article views public-private contracting through the efficiency lens, as augmented
by behavioral law and economics, which studies how people make boundedly rational
choices. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1051, 1054–55 (2000). For a good, high-level discussion of other approaches to
contract theory, see generally Stephen A. Smith, CONTRACT THEORY, (Oxford University
Press 2004). See also Part II, infra. It also considers the implications of agency theory.
See, e.g., A. A. Berle. and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(Macmillan, New York, 1932); Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976). Transaction cost economics is a related concept that focuses on incentive systems
and governance mechanisms in the face of competing goals amongst the parties. See, e.g.,
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 233 (1979).
27
It is for this reason that private service provision is likely to result in lower quality than
direct government provision, although this an empirical question to which there is currently
no clear answer. For a further discussion of how outsourcing may differ from direct
government service provision, see Part III(B), infra.
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competitive market, the reality is that in certain types of public-private
contracting, the seller-side market is shallow. For instance, very few
entities are positioned to provide such complex and sophisticated services
as administering Medicaid for a state or running a prison, which have no
commercial analogs.
Therefore contracts do not benefit from the
competitive effects of an efficient market. In addition, many government
services are difficult to specify and monitor—at least quality is difficult to
specify and monitor. Cost-savings are somewhat easier to detect. But
despite best efforts, contracts are inherently incomplete. Even if a party can
specify performance metrics, it may get just what it asked for, sacrificing
compliance with higher-level goals.
These two systematic biases cause the transacting parties to impose
a cost on service recipients in the form of low quality service. As a result
(putting aside potential bargaining problems), contracts are underpriced.
Thus, what appears to be a cost-saving mechanism is instead a systematic
market failure. Absent competitive market mechanisms, the contracting
parties are not forced to internalize these costs. This Article proposes a
counterintuitive solution grounded in contract theory and doctrine to force
the parties to internalize the cost of poor service provision: reading a
mandatory duty into public-private contracts.
Economists argue that when the assumptions of the typical private
business transaction are in place, contract law should have default rules that
parties can contract around—not mandatory rules.28 This Article suggests
the opposite for public-private contracting. To combat the problem that the
government is not incentivized to care about poor service (and nor is the
private, profit-maximizing provider), the transacting parties should be
subject to a mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest.
Essentially, the parties should be prohibited from imposing a cost on the
public in the form of poor service. The rule would function like a
heightened good faith and fair dealing requirement. Beneficiaries of the
service should be permitted to sue to enforce the duty. Although
conventional economic wisdom is that mandatory standards are undesirable
because they hinder bargaining to efficient outcomes, that logic does not
apply where there are market failures and contracts do not account for costs
imposed on third-parties who cannot protect themselves.29
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes public-private
contracts for the provision of traditional government services and gives
28

Id.; see also Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE
L.J. 926 (2010).
29
It may be more intuitive to think about beneficiaries (i.e. prisoners in the New Jersey
example or welfare beneficiaries in the Indiana example) as the principal to the government
as agent. I would argue, however, that the voters or taxpayers are a better proxy for the
“principal” and that the beneficiaries, who in my examples are unlikely to be paying taxes
other than sales tax and probably represent a small percentage of the voting population, are
more like customers who lack the conventional market power we attribute to customers.
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examples of two high-profile failures where cost savings were achieved at
the expense of quality service provision. Part II explores the economic
model of contracting, and in particular efficiency theory and agency theory,
in the context of the traditional firm-firm commercial transaction. Part III
then considers the problems in public-private contracting through an
economic lens. It emphasizes that governments privatize to take advantage
of market forces and expect that their contracts will function similarly to
firm-firm commercial agreements. However, the major assumptions of
efficiency theory and agency theory conceived with a commercial
transaction in mind do not apply to public-private contracts. Rather, poor
markets, agency costs, misaligned incentives, and complicated service
models that defy precise definition result in a systematic bias. Parties write
contracts that reduce price but sacrifice quality. Finally, Part IV suggests a
possible solution to mitigate these problems: reading into these contracts a
mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest. This solution,
although not perfect, encourages the parties to internalize the costs of poor
service delivery.
I.

Contracts for the Provision of Government Services

Proponents of government outsourcing argue that it is more efficient
and cost-effective30 than government provision of the same services.31
Governments function loosely as a monopoly and lack the incentive to
innovate to save cost. By introducing competition, so the argument goes,
private firms are motivated to deliver services efficiently and effectively. In
addition, whereas the government must negotiate a considerable
bureaucracy, private entities have more flexibility to adjust staffing and
wage levels and to utilize private capital as necessary. 32 Privatization
proponents conceive of public-private contracting similarly to commercial
contracting and expect that governments can take advantage of market
mechanisms at play in commercial transactions.

30

There have been many studies but no consensus on whether privatization actually cuts
costs. See Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of
Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149 at 150-51 (2010) (“studies have found that private
prisons may reduce the cost of housing inmates by as much as 15% . . . [but] the costsaving claim remains controversial. Some researchers have observed that private prison
contractors typically siphon off the least costly inmates-those who are healthier and less
violent than the incarcerated population as a whole. More generally, simple cost
comparisons that appear to favor private facilities are based on per diem rates that may not
reflect the full cost of incarceration.”) (internal citations omitted).
31
See, e.g., E.S. Savas, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT (1987); David
A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL L REV 393, 400 (2008).
32
Id.; see also E.S. Savas, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 188 at
111-12 (2000); David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 250-79 (1992).
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Criticism of public-private contracting, however, is widespread.
Scholars condemn the efficacy of privatization, the failure of private
providers to comply with democratic norms, and the lack of accountability
and transparency in public-private contracting.33
Not all types of contracting out are subject to these criticisms. The
public management literature distinguishes two types of government
outsourcing contracts (focusing on state and local-level contracting): 34
those for “soft” government services and those for “hard” government
services.35 Hard services are those that are easy to specify, involve little
discretion, and where delegation causes minimal transaction costs.
Examples include garbage collection, fire protection, or road construction. 36
If a company fails to collect garbage on the designated days, the failure
would be easy to detect. Almost all local governments contract with private
parties to provide hard services to some degree.
Soft services are those in which people are the service focus.37 Soft
services tend to be more difficult to define and measure and involve
discretion. Soft services have been called complex human services, and
include running prisons, administering welfare benefits, and providing
education. In contrast to hard services, specifying how to run a prison is
much more complicated. It involves issues of security, health care,
rehabilitation, etc. It is also much more difficult for the government to
know when service provision falters.
Hard and soft government services also typically differ with respect
to the extent of their public reach. It tends to be true that soft services are
more likely to affect a narrow, disenfranchised segment of the population—
for instance the poor in the case of welfare benefits or criminals in the case
33

See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2.
This Article focuses on state and local level outsourcing because such contracts are, for
the most part, subject to the same doctrinal contract rules as commercial contracting. See
Caruso, supra note 6 at 669-670. It does not address federal government contracting or
procurement, which are highly legislated by Congress and regulated by agencies. See, e.g.,
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) § 2711, Pub L No 98-369, 98 Stat 1175,
1175-81, codified at 41 USC § 253 (containing competition requirements for government
procurement procedures). In addition, claims involving federal contracts are generally
resolved in the Court of Federal Claims. Therefore, “tribunals deciding government
contracts cases and those deciding common law contracts cases most frequently work
without cross-pollination.” 56 MD. L. REV. at 556-57.
35
See, e.g., Anna Amirkhanyan, Collaborative performance measurement: Examining and
explaining the relevance of collaboration in state and local government contracts,
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 19 (3) at 523-54 (2009);
Meeyoung Lamothe and Scott Lamothe, What Determines the Formal Versus Relational
Nature of Local Government Contracting?, URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW 48 (3) at 322-353
(2012).
36
For more examples of hard vs. soft government services, see Lamothe, supra note 35 at
App. A.
37
Id., see also Ruth Hoogland DeHoog, Competition, negotiation, or cooperation: Three
models for service contracting. ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY 22 (3) at 317-40 (1990).
34
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of prisons—whereas hard services are more likely to affect the whole
population. Garbage collection and road construction benefit essentially
everyone in a community.
The differences in these types or categories of services matter in
meaningful ways. As Part III will explain in more detail, outsourcing of
soft government services tends to be more problematic than outsourcing of
hard government services.38 With soft services, markets tend to be
shallower, tasks are harder to specify, and the ability of beneficiaries to
exert pressure to force good service is more limited than with hard
services.39 Nonetheless, there has been a rise in government outsourcing of
soft government services in the past decade.40
The two examples that follow lay the groundwork for the types of
problems these public-private contracts for the provision of traditional (soft)
government services often face.
A.
Prison Example: The New Jersey-Community Education
Centers Contract
In the late 1990s, New Jersey contracted with Community Education
Centers (“CEC”), a private company, to provide halfway house services (a
“soft” government service).41 The contract requires CEC to establish
facilities to house inmates released early from New Jersey prisons.42 It also
requires that CEC provide various services to assimilate inmates back into
society.43 The term halfway “houses” is a bit misleading. The facilities can
38

See Sergio Fernandez, Accounting for Performance in Contracting for Services: Are
Successful Contractual Relationships Controlled or Managed?, Paper presented at the 8th
Public Management Research Conference, Los Angeles, California, and hosted by the
School of Policy, Planning, and Development at the University of Southern California,
September 29 to October 1, 2005, at 11. (“Previous research indicates a higher incidence of
performance problems when contracting for “soft” services, such as public safety and
human services, which typically involve more complex processes and technologies and
which can be more difficult to specify and measure.”).
39
See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 2 (arguing that contracts for run-ofthe-mill supplies and commercial services “may pose few problems”). Also, John Donahue
uses a different vocabulary but makes a similar point. He defines “commodity tasks” as
ones that are “well defined, relatively easy to evaluate, and available from competitive
private suppliers . . . .” He contrasts commodity tasks with “custom tasks.” Ultimately, he
argues that commodity tasks are more suitable for outsourcing than custom tasks. See
Donohue, supra note 2 at 49.
40
See supra notes 1-3.
41
See Sam Dolnick, As Escapees Stream Out, A Penal Business Thrives, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, June 16, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/nyregion/in-newjersey-halfway-houses-escapees-stream-out-as-a-penal-businessthrives.html?pagewanted=all.
42
Id.
43
See Sam Dolnick, At A Half-Way House, Bedlam Reigns, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June
17, 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/at-bo-robinson-ahalfway-house-in-new-jersey-bedlam-reigns.html?_r=1&smid=fb-share.
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have as many as 1200 beds, making them as big as prisons. And roughly 40
percent of New Jersey’s state prison population passes through the system
of private halfway houses.44
CEC is compensated by a flat fee per inmate per day housed that
amounts to roughly half the cost of housing inmates in state prisons.45 The
contract thus reduces prison costs. In addition, by freeing beds in the state
prisons, those prisons can rent beds to the federal government to house
federal inmates and immigration detainees, which raises revenue. One New
Jersey county receives $108 per day for each bed in their jail the federal
government uses, and spends $73 per day for a bed at a CEC half-way
house.46 It keeps the difference.47
The New York Times recently published a series of articles following
a ten-month investigation of these private halfway houses. They labeled the
halfway houses as “at the vanguard of a national movement to privatize
correctional facilities.”48 But they reported that the halfway houses “seem[]
to embody the worst in the prisons [they were] intended to supplant.”49
First, there are not enough guards or sufficient security. Although
inmates have more freedom in halfway houses than prisons, state law still
emphasizes that these facilities must be secure.50 Because of lax security,
gang activity is high and escapes occur too frequently. 51 The New York
Times reports that “[s]ince 2005, roughly 5,100 inmates have escaped from
the state’s privately run halfway houses.”52 Some escapees have gone on to
commit gruesome crimes. One halfway house escapee who was jailed for
assaulting a former girlfriend escaped and immediately killed another young
44

See Dolnick, supra note 41.
See Dolnick, supra note 41.
46
See Sam Dolnick, A Volatile Mix Fuels A Murder, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 18,
2012, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/nyregion/at-a-new-jersey-halfway-house-a-volatilemix-fuels-a-murder.html?ref=unlocked (noting that about 40 percent of that county’s jail
space, or roughly 2,400 beds, are now reserved for federal use).
47
Id.
48
See Dolnick, supra note 43.
49
Id.
50
State of New Jersey, Office of the State Comptroller, State Comptroller audit exposes
crucial weaknesses in state oversight of inmate halfway houses (June 15, 2011) (“Despite
emphasis in state law on ensuring the security of these facilities, DOC officials were unable
to provide a precise total of escapes over that time period for all halfway house facilities.”),
available at: http://www.nj.gov/comptroller/news/docs/doc_pr.pdf.
51
See Dolnick, supra note 41.
52
The New York Times compares this number to escapees from state prisons. The author
states that the “the state’s prisons had three escapes in 2010 and none in the first nine
months of 2011, the last period for which the state gave figures.” See Dolnick, supra note
41. A more apt comparison would be between privately run halfway houses and state-run
halfway houses, but such data is not readily available. It is therefore difficult to assess
what this number means in the abstract, other than to say that the number sounds high for
what is supposed to be a secure facility.
45
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woman.53 Another inmate imprisoned for drugs and weapons charges
escaped and went on to kill a man just three miles from the halfway house.54
Second, the counseling services that New Jersey pays for are not
being provided.55 Workers falsify inmate records and management does
nothing despite seeing case file after case file with identical records.
Third, the halfway houses were originally designed to house and
rehabilitate only non-violent offenders.56 But low-level offenders are now
thrown in with violent offenders. One non-violent offender was recently
murdered by a convict with a violent history in a CEC halfway house.57
The reasons for these breakdowns are undoubtedly complicated, but
one issue is clear. Contracting out for this service has not solved the
problems that plague government-run prisons as privatization theory
predicts.58 To maximize profit, CEC is incentivized to house as many
inmates as possible in its facility at any given point in time. It also has the
incentive to keep its costs as low as possible.59 Therefore, it operates
without enough staff or adequate security.
Additionally, as the state comptroller determined in an audit last
year, state oversight and monitoring of the program have been lacking:60
[A]s a state we have done a poor job of monitoring the
program and have made no real attempt to find out what
taxpayers are getting for their money. It is critical that the
state takes a more active role in ensuring the success of these
programs. It cannot simply cut these halfway houses a check
and hope for the best.61
Poor monitoring likely means that the government did not know the
extent of the problems prior to the New York Times expose, which reports
that when CEC “gave tours of Bo Robinson to officials or potential
investors, everything was staged. Hallways were scrubbed and painted.
Visitors were kept far from the men’s units, the rowdiest areas.”62

53

See Dolnick, supra note 46.
Id.
55
See Dolnick, supra note 43 (“The government requires that Bo Robinson provide
therapy, job training and other services, but current and former workers said they had
neither the skills nor the time to do so.”).
56
See Dolnick, supra note 46.
57
Id.
58
For further comparison of direct service provision with private contractor provision, see
Part III(A)(3), infra.
59
See Dolnick, supra note 43 (“Community Education made money not on how many
people they rehabilitated. ‘How many bodies can we get in here and keep here for a certain
amount of time?’ — that’s what they were interested in.”).
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See N.J. Comptroller Report, supra note 50.
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See Dolnick, supra note 43.
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If New Jersey entered into the contract believing it would save
money and CEC would provide high-quality service, this has not occurred.
Rather, the government seems to have succeeded in cost cutting, but at the
expense of quality.63
B.

Welfare Example: The Indiana-IBM Contract

State and local governments have long relied on private actors to
provide welfare services,64 but there has been a dramatic increase in the last
two decades.65
Notably, in 1996, Congress enacted the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).66
The Act, part of the “reinvent government” movement, explicitly provided
that a state can administer its welfare programs “through contracts with
charitable, religious, or private organizations.”67 Accordingly, state and
local governments turned to the private sector to provide a range of (soft)
government services.
Indiana had an antiquated and highly inefficient welfare system,
thought to be one of the worst in the nation, with high error rates, long
customer wait times, onerous in-person appearance requirements, and high
rates of fraud.68
In 2006, Indiana’s Family and Social Services
Administration (“FSSA”) signed a $1.37 billion, ten-year contract with IBM
to revamp, modernize, and take over the application process and general
administration of the system.69 Under the terms of the agreement, IBM was
to automate components of a system that were previously caseworkerbased. It also had “the day-to-day responsibilities of working with
beneficiaries to determine their eligibility and process their appeals.”70 The
contract required IBM’s subcontractor to hire the former state caseworkers
63

Some may argue that by privatizing, the government knows it will receive lower quality
in return for reduced cost, but that view is at odds with privatization theory. This issue is
addressed further in Part III(A), infra.
64
See Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare: A Comparative Perspective, 5 LAW
& ETHICS HUM. RTS. 336, 339 (2011) (using a comparative approach to discuss challenges
to accountability and human rights that arise from using privatization in the welfare
context).
65
See Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power Reconfiguring
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 278-81
(2009) (“The most recent national survey, released in 2002 by the United States General
Accounting Office, reported that in 2001, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
used contracts with private entities to provide some welfare services.).
66
42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
67
Id.
68
Press Release, “IBM Seeks Enforcement of Indiana Welfare Contract” (May 13, 2010),
available at: http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/31641.wss (last visited
February 19, 2012).
69
Id.
70
Bowman v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 1:11-CV-00593-RLY, 2012 WL 566258, at *2
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2012) (internal citations omitted).
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to handle these tasks. Although the state “retained final authority to
approve or disapprove eligibility[,] it was dependent upon the factgathering, computer entries, and recommendations of the IBM Coalition
staff when making correct determinations on whether to start, stop, or
change Medicaid coverage for an individual.”71 IBM and its subcontractors
had considerable discretion over issues such as whether to require
additional documentation (medical records, interviews, etc.) to demonstrate
eligibility.
IBM implemented the modernized system in over fifty Indiana
counties, but it was not a success.72 Significant problems were reported,
from lost applications to delays in approving benefits, failure to process
appeals, and errors in decision-making regarding eligibility.73 Individual
beneficiaries claim that these problems led to a host of serious
consequences. As mentioned above, one mother has sued claiming that her
schizophrenic son was forced to go off of his medication when he was
denied benefits and gouged her eyes out.74 Other plaintiffs have alleged
that inability to obtain benefits resulted in consequences from serious
medical ailments to lost educational opportunities.75
Ultimately, in 2009, Indiana cancelled the contract and instead
contracted directly with IBM’s subcontractors.76 Indiana kept some of
IBM’s design and its hardware, but implemented a “hybrid” system that
returned caseworkers to the process. Both parties sued. Indiana sought the
return of $437 million in fees it had paid to IBM, and treble damages—
amounting to more than $1.3 billion.77 IBM claimed the state still owed
$100 million under the contract.
The legal dispute centered on whether IBM had breached the
contract by failing to satisfy certain performance metrics. The parties also
disputed whether Indiana cancelled the contract “for cause” or “for
convenience,” a distinction that affects damages.78
Medicaid applicants also sued IBM under a variety of theories.
Notably, they tried to establish standing to sue for breach of contract as
third-party beneficiaries. But in general, members of the public cannot sue
to enforce public-private contracts such as this one.79 It is particularly true
71

Id.
Press Release, supra note 68.
73
Id.
74
Land, supra note 19
75
See Gibson, supra note 18; Bowman, supra note 70.
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Id.
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Id., see also “Indiana, IBM sue each other over welfare contract,” INDIANA BUSINESS
JOURNAL, available at: http://www.ibj.com/indiana-ibm-sue-each-other-over-welfarecontract/PARAMS/article/19928
78
See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment for IBM, Indiana v. Int’l Bus.
Mach. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451 (Ind. Super. Ct. July 18, 2012) [“Final Order”].
79
See Part IV(A)(3), infra.
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that members of the public cannot sue where the contract contains an
explicit “no-third party beneficiaries” clause, as the Indiana-IBM contract
does, and as is common in such agreements. On that basis, the Indiana
court dismissed the putative class’s claim for breach of contract.80
The Marion County, Indiana court also recently issued its decision
in the main case.81 It denied Indiana’s claims and granted IBM $52 million
in damages to cover the cost of equipment Indiana kept and subcontractor
assignment fees. The court stated:
Neither party deserves to win this case. This story represents
a ‘perfect storm’ of misguided government policy and
overzealous corporate ambition. Overall, both parties are to
blame and Indiana’s taxpayers are left as apparent losers.82
Indiana vows to appeal, but regardless of the ultimate outcome, the
Indiana-IBM result is undesirable. The parties both spent resources
implementing a system that they ultimately abandoned (at least in part).
And allegedly, Medicaid beneficiaries received poor service that resulted in
serious ramifications for their health and well-being. Both parties have also
spent untold resources on litigation.
C.

Other Examples

Certainly not every public-private contract for the provision of soft
government services results in poor service provision to the public. No
empirical study has attempted to measure the success of these public-private
agreements in any systematic way over any significant sample size.83 That
being said, the New Jersey and Indiana experiences are far from isolated.
Texas had an agreement with Accenture LLP and Maximus, Inc.,
similar to the IBM-Indiana contract. The agreement encountered similar
difficulties and was cancelled as a part of a December 2008 settlement of
claims.84 New York City's first large-scale privatization effort also failed.
Following PRWORA, the City of New York contracted with private
vendors to provide welfare-to-work services.85 A research study conducted
by Community Voices Heard states: “Our findings point to a failure of this
work-first model in achieving its main goal – moving people from welfare
80

See Bowman, supra note 70.
Final Order, supra note 78.
82
Id.
83
Indeed, it is often lamented that there are myriad case studies on privatization failures
and privatization successes, but little to no systematic empirical data on the privatization
experience more broadly. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 at 47.
84
12/21/2008 Settlement Agreement, available at:
http://alt.coxnewsweb.com/statesman/pdf/12/121208_accenture.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2012).
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See Bach, supra note 65 at 286.
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to work, into jobs and toward economic independence.”86 Instead of
focusing on long-term employment success through education and training,
the private entities worked with the easiest candidates to place, ignoring the
more difficult cases, and targeted short-term job placement, even if it was
unlikely to stick.87
In another example, Nebraska contracted with KVC Behavioral
Health Services, a private firm, to manage and coordinate child welfare
services across the state.88 The arrangement was highly criticized and
encountered problems from the outset.89 A performance audit was
undertaken at the request of the Health and Human Services Committee. 90
The Committee “found that the reform effort lacked specific goals, had no
clear timetable and failed to consider the true cost of a reform that has cost
$30 million more than original projections.”91 The relationship was
mutually terminated on February 21, 2012, when KVC sought additional
funds to complete its contractual duties.92 Several bills seeking to bring the
system back into state control have been introduced in the state
legislature.93 Maryland and Connecticut, among other states and localities,
have had similar experiences.94
86

Id.; see also Sondra Youdelman with Paul Getsos, Research Findings on NYC’s
Employment
Services and Placement System and Its Effectiveness In Moving People from Welfare to
Work, A Research Project by Community Voices Heard (2005), available at
http://www.cvhaction.org/sites/default/files/The%20Revolving%20DoorExecutive%20Summary.pdf
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Id.
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Grant Schulte, 4th agency quitting Nebraska's child welfare system, raising questions
about privatized effort,
http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/9348128d09cf49cfb1b1838e90edc7d4/NE--ChildWelfare-Management/, February 21, 2012; JoAnne Young, Child Welfare Reorganizes
after Loss of KVC, http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/nebraska/child-welfarereorganizes-after-loss-of-kvc/article_23f2bb24-0cde-5c37-979c-b20155533f73.html,
February 21, 2012.
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Schulte, supra note 88.
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Agency Supported Foster Care Contract Between the Nebraska Department of Health
and Human Services Division of Children and Family Services and KVC Behavioral
Healthcare Nebraska, Inc., Part II.A, available at,
http://dhhs.ne.gov/children_family_services/Contracts/48872O4KVCAgencySupportedFC.
pdf, accessed March 7, 2012.
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Performance Audit Committee Nebraska Legislature, DHHS Privatization of Child
Welfare and Juvenile Services, Committee Report, Vol. 17, No. 1, November, 2011,
available at http://nebraska.watchdog.org/files/2011/11/privatization2011.pdf, accessed
March 7, 2012.
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Id.
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Martha Stoddard, Lawmakers debate ending child welfare privatization (February 29,
2012), available at: http://www.omaha.com/article/20120228/NEWS01/702299953.
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See, e.g., Greg Garland, Lockheed Called Failure on Child Support Goals: State
Announces Collection Contract Will Not Be Extended, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 1999, at 1B
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In the prison context, media reports and case studies similar to the
New Jersey example are pervasive.95 Accounts have documented numerous
incidents of “abuse, neglect, violence, escapes, poor conditions, and other
alarming events in private facilities.”96 Studies are inconclusive or mixed
on the quality of care differential between public and private prisons, but
there is at least some indication that “private prisons experience a higher
proportion of inmate-on-inmate assaults; greater likelihood of inmate
misconduct, drug abuse, and escapes; lower or unmet standards of care; and
systemic problems in maintaining secure facilities.”97
Before addressing the question of why these public-private
agreements for government services (in particular soft government services)
tend to result in low quality service provision,98 it is necessary to lay some
groundwork. The next Part turns to contract theory and its traditional
application to firm-firm commercial agreements.

examples, as well, in Privatized Welfare, supra note 21; Diller, supra note 7 at 1740 (2002)
(discussing the privatization of Florida’s public assistance program for needy families); and
Verkuil, supra note 8 at 436–37 (several examples).
95
For examples of private prisons around the country and associated media attention, see
Grassroots Leadership, CONSIDERING A PRIVATE JAIL, PRISON, OR DETENTION CENTER? A
RESOURCE PACKET FOR COMMUNITY MEMBERS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS (2nd ed, Austin, TX
2009), and the online resources of The Private Corrections Working Group,
http://www.privateci.org/. See also Fred Grimm, Horrors continue in privatized lockups,
MIAMI HERALD (June 25, 2012),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/25/2867737/horrors-continue-in-privatized.html
(reporting on lawsuit allegations of staffers using violent “take-down” tactics,
orchestrating inmate-on-inmate fights and doing little to protect vulnerable kids from
violent attacks from other inmates in private juvenile prison); Jeff Amy, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 12, 2012) (reporting on citations issued by OSHA against private prison for
knowingly failing to provide adequate staffing, fix malfunctioning cell door locks or
provide training to protect employees from inmate violence); American Civil Liberties
Union of Ohio, Prisons for profit: A look at prison privatization. (Cleveland, OH 2011);
Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 5, at 186 (describing issues with private prison
contracts); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 461
(2005) (detailing quality failures at CCA's Youngstown, Ohio, facility).
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Christopher Hartney & Caroline Glesmann, How Corporations Are Reshaping Criminal
Justice in the U.S.,
National Council on Crime and Delinquency (Oakland, CA 2012), available at:
http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf.
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The Economic Approach to Contract Law

Scholarly criticism of the problems discussed in the prior Part is not
novel. Public law scholars have analyzed problems with poor service
provision and lack of accountability in depth. But commercial law scholars
have not approached these problems from a private law—and in particular
an efficiency theory—perspective. Doing so yields a new way to frame
these problems, and a new set of potential solutions.
There are many theories of contract law. Efficiency theory and
autonomy theories are the most prominent. Efficiency theorists tend to
study commercial contracts between sophisticated firms. They apply the
principles of law and economics and argue that the law should encourage
rational actors to enter into economically efficient contracts that maximize
the joint surplus.99 Autonomy theorists focus mostly on individualindividual contracting, arguing that contract obligations are deserving of
respect based on the rights of the contracting parties regardless of whether
they tend to produce other benefits.100 Efficiency gains are the major reason
that governments enter into privatization agreements, therefore, it makes the
most sense to explore these contracts through an efficiency lens. Put
another way, public-private contracts are modeled on the firm-firm
commercial contracting platform. The idea is that public-private contracts
will function like traditional commercial agreements and indeed the law
treats these agreements essentially the same as traditional commercial
agreements.101 Therefore, this Article applies efficiency theory principles to
better understand why public-private contracts tend to result in poor service
provision. But before that, this Part briefly covers how efficiency theory
approaches firm-firm commercial agreements.
A.

Efficiency Theory

The economic analysis of law proposes that the purpose of the law
should be to promote economic efficiency.102 Building upon the work of
Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi, Richard Posner first laid the
groundwork for efficiency theory in the 1970s. He argued for the
“allocation of resources in which value is maximized[.]”103 It followed that
the goal of contract doctrine should be “to minimize [contractual]
99

Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 619.
See supra note 25.
101
In addition, because non-economic theories of contract mostly focus on individualindividual contracting, they seem to have more limited application to public-private
contracting.
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98 (6th ed. 2003) (defining and differentiating between two
models of efficiency, one based on a concept of Pareto-superiority and the other on the
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transaction costs, broadly understood as obstacles to efforts voluntarily to
shift resources to their most valuable use.”104
Put simply, parties trade efficiently when, and only when, the value
of the exchanged performance to the buyer exceeds the cost of performance
to the seller. These types of deals are “efficient.” The focus of efficiency
theory is on ex ante efficient contracting;105 i.e. which rules will encourage
parties to enter into deals that are efficient and wealth maximizing?
Efficiency theory is predicated on a number of assumptions rooted
in firm-firm commercial contracts.106 In a world of low transaction costs
and a competitive market, efficiency theory assumes that rational market
participants will bargain efficiently to maximize the joint surplus.107
Efficiency theory further assumes that contracts do not impose negative
externalities.108 The following subparts discuss these assumptions, which
pervade efficiency theory analysis, but tend not to be present in publicprivate contracting.
1.

Rational Actors Incentivized by Maximizing Profit
Obtain Gains from Trade and Efficiently Split
Surplus

A central tenet of efficiency theory is that parties will make rational,
wealth-maximizing choices. Efficiency theory assumes that parties value
assets more or less correctly and that their transacting choices are motivated
solely by wealth maximization goals.109 Relatedly, efficiency theory
assumes that parties can make rational, wealth-maximizing choices because
they have good information and “can take clues from the market.”110
The existence of a competitive market is said to reinforce rationality.
Where rational actors have choices and contracting parties do a poor job,
they will lose renewal opportunities and future work from other contracting
partners.111 Similarly, individual manager failures will come to the
104

Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1581, 1583 (2005). See also Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note
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attention of owners through well-functioning feedback mechanisms. For
this reason, efficiency theory assumes that managers rationally pursue
profit-maximizing strategies.112 Indeed, contracting agents are often
financially incentivized by the overall profit goal of the company, for
instance, by having their bonuses tied to firm profitability.
There are, however, limits to the rationality assumption that are now
well accepted. Studies have shown that parties, due to both intrinsic limits
of cognition and limited availability of information, do not know, nor can
know, all the feasible alternative actions open to them. And they may have
reasons for making decisions apart from pure profit maximization. For
instance, goals can bias beliefs. People overvalue things they own. And the
way a choice is framed can alter decisions.113 Therefore, actors are said to
have bounded rationality.114
Nonetheless, where firm-firm commercial interactions are
concerned, the rationality assumption continues to predominate. As Alan
Schwartz and Robert Scott have stated, “it is a plausible working
assumption that firms rationally pursue the objective of maximizing
profits.”115
2.

Role of a Well-Functioning Market

Efficiency theory also assumes that parties transact in a competitive
market. A competitive market has enough buyers and sellers such that each
party has many alternative trading partners. It permits parties to make
rational decisions to maximize their wealth because efficient markets are
self-correcting and will counteract faulty decision-making. A competitive
market also allocates resources efficiently and allows parties to reach
efficient price terms.116
Market participants have greater incentives to maximize profit when
they are subject to competitive pressures. Competition allows contracting
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Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 551.
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parties to credibly threaten to take their business elsewhere.117 Competition
also creates pressure to generate information to permit comparisons of
options.118 Competition is said to create incentives for innovation and
increased efficiency, at least in private markets.119
Where there is market failure, economists argue that regulation may
be (although will not necessarily be) merited. The most obvious example of
market failure requiring regulation is monopoly, regulated by the laws of
antitrust.
3.

Absence of Negative Externalities

The third related assumption of efficiency theory is the absence of
negative externalities.120 An externality is an effect that a transaction
between one set of parties puts on other parties who were not a part of the
deal (and presumably had no say in the matter). Externalities may be
negative or positive. A positive externality is a benefit to non-parties,
whereas a negative externality imposes costs on non-parties. If a
transaction has a negative externality, then the true cost of the transaction is
higher than that paid by the parties. The classic example of a negative
externality is pollution generated by a productive enterprise that negatively
affects the public, but the cost of which was not internalized by the
transaction.
Efficiency theory is typically applied “to contracts between firms
that do not create externalities.”121 In the absence of externalities, and
where there is a competitive market, economic theory states that efficient
transacting occurs. On the other hand, when a negative externality exists in
an unregulated market, contracting parties do not take responsibility for the
costs their deal passes on to society.122 Thus, contract law cannot trust that
a deal represents an efficient outcome because the price of the contract does
not represent the true cost of the transaction.
4.

Efficiency Theory and Default Rules

Efficiency theory cannot explain all of contract doctrine.123 But the
normative version of efficiency theory has been used extensively to argue
117
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what contract doctrine should be, particularly as to firm-firm commercial
agreements. For example, efficiency theory has been invoked to argue that
contract law should prefer default rules over mandatory rules.
A perfect contract would provide for every contingency, but in the
real world, contracts are incomplete. A default rule is one that fills a gap in
a contract where the parties have not selected a different rule. Default rules
can be contracted around if the parties make an explicit choice to do so. An
example is awarding expectation damages—parties can specify a different
measure of damages if they choose.124 On the other hand, a mandatory or
immutable rule is one that the parties cannot contract around. The most
common example is the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Efficiency theory, in general, supports the use of default rules, not
mandatory rules. Indeed, law and economics scholars have long fought
against the use of immutable rules, including those based on public
policy.125 They argue that particularly where parties are rational actors
functioning in a competitive market, the law should trust the parties to enter
into a deal that maximizes the joint surplus. If the parties are prevented
from certain outcomes due to the existence of mandatory rules, the result
generally will be less efficient. Judge Frank Easterbrook has said that the
imposition of mandatory rules “almost invariably ensure[s] that there will
be fewer gains and more losses tomorrow” because “[a] right that cannot be
the subject of bargaining is worth less, just as eagle feathers that cannot be
sold are worth less to their owners.”126 And in their famous article on
filling gaps in incomplete contracts, Robert Gertner and Ian Ayres argued
that “[i]mmutability is justified only if unregulated contracting would be
socially deleterious because parties internal or external to the contract
cannot adequately protect themselves.”127
124

Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
Vol. A-D 585 (Peter Newman, ed., 1998).
125
G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 500
(1993), see also Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 237, 239 (1988). Even if it can be shown theoretically that an immutable
rule might be efficient, economists have concluded that “there is small hope that lawmakers
will be able to divine the efficient rule in practice.” Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 733
(1992).
126
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and The Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 11 (1984). Even default rules can affect party preferences. See Russell Korobkin,
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998).
127
Robert Gertner & Ian Ayres, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989). Note that not all economists decry all
mandatory rules. Steven Burton famously defended the mandatory duty of good faith and
fair dealing on economic grounds, arguing that the rule serves as a way to remedy
asymmetries in information and opportunistic behavior, both of which add transaction costs
and muddy the perfect contracting environment. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980).
Judge Posner echoed Professor Burton’s argument in Market Street Assocs. Ltd.
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW,
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Agency Theory

Agency theory is a particular application of efficiency theory. 128 It
focuses on the issues that arise when an agent carries out work on behalf of
a principal, and the interests of the two parties do not coincide.129
Efficiency theory predicts that in a well-functioning market, where there is
perfect information and the ability to monitor, there should be little
difficulty aligning incentives between principals and agents. If the principal
is able to sufficiently monitor the agent’s performance, it can design
sanctions and incentives to encourage optimal behavior. Further, if the
agent knows that the principal will become aware of poor performance, and
there are switching options in the marketplace, the agent will be dissuaded
from performing poorly.130 The agent will also be concerned about
reputational effects of poor quality service provision.
Agency problems are often said to arise between the shareholders of
a firm (the principals) and its managers (the agents). But efficiency theory
ultimately dismisses these costs as being avoidable because both parties
have an interest in the firm maximizing its profit.131
However, in many principal-agent relationships, there is information
asymmetry in that the agent knows more about its actions than the principal
does. The principal either cannot fully monitor the agent or it is too costly
to adequately monitor the agent.132 Moral hazard occurs when the agent
acts in ways that the principal would not want it to act, if it knew fully what
the agent was doing.133
Agency theory focuses on correcting for this type of opportunistic
behavior. As it pertains to contracting, specifically, it focuses on the ways
in which principals can try to align incentives through contract. For
Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991): “The parties want to minimize the
costs of performance. To the extent that a doctrine of good faith designed to do this by
reducing defensive expenditures is a reasonable measure to this end, interpolating it into
the contract advances the parties’ joint goal.”
128
The term “agency theory” is used here in the economic sense and is distinct from
principles of common law agency, where the same term may be found.
129
Kieron Walsh, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS: COMPETITION,
CONTRACTING AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 37 (St. Martin’s Press 1995).
130
See generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 295-97 (1980) (discussing the extent to which market forces can discipline
managers).
131
In actuality, agents’ incentives are far more complicated. For instance, they may have
an incentive to take actions that will be externally visible and enhance their attractiveness
to future employers. Or they may have an incentive to exert little effort on tasks that will
never be visible to shareholders.
132
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976); Steven
Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 55, 66 (1979).
133
Id.
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example, principals can pay for good outcomes or issue sanctions for bad
ones, require compliance with certain specific performance measures,
and/or invoke reporting procedures.134
Although agency issues come up in many contexts, private business
outsourcing is an obvious example. Recent studies describe how parties
engaged in business outsourcing confront issues of incentive alignment and
control in practice.135 For instance, one study reports finding a spectrum in
contractual governance mechanisms that parties use to mitigate agency
costs. At one end of the spectrum are “market-like” contracts that adopt
fixed fees, weak or no incentive or penalty clauses, and pay little attention
to service levels or monitoring rights—essentially low control contracts. At
the other end of the spectrum are “firm-like” contracts that utilize extensive
financial incentives and control rights, with considerable monitoring and
economic consequences linked to performance.136 In the study sample,
firms pursuing simpler outsourcing functions (i.e. IT or call center work)
tended to choose contracts at the market-like (less control) end of the
spectrum. On the other hand, entities outsourcing more complex business
functions with higher risk for agency costs used more firm-like (higher
control) contractual governance mechanisms.137 It is unsurprising that
commercial parties facing potentially high agency costs are utilizing many
of the control mechanisms suggested by traditional agency theory.
III.

Problems in Public-Private Contracts

Efficiency theory postulates that contracts will be efficient where the
assumptions discussed in the prior Part are satisfied. But efficiency
theorists recognize that the traditional assumptions do not always apply. 138
134

Walsh, supra note 129 at 37.
See George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions,
96 VA. L. REV. 241, 271-72 (2010); Margaret M. Blair, Erin O'Hara O'Connor, Gregg
Kirchhoefer, Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV.
263 (2011).
136
Geis, supra note 135. It is somewhat disingenuous to discuss these studies under the
heading “Agency Theory,” because this work investigates the implications of transaction
cost economics (TCE). TCE shares certain similarities with agency theory in that it, too, is
concerned with conflicts arising from a divergence of goals between contracting parties.
TCE is generally invoked in the context of a firm’s “make or buy” decision and considers
the transaction costs involved in contracting out for a product or service rather than
handling it “in house.” Although there are important differences between agency theory
and TCE, the distinctions are of little import to this Article, where the focus is on the
problems that may ensue between principals and agents in a poor market where incentives
are not aligned.
137
Id.
138
As Victor Goldberg noted many years ago, but which is still true to a lesser extent
today, “[t]he paradigmatic contract of economic theory (and of law) is a discrete
transaction conveying a well-defined object (the ever popular widget) in exchange for
cash.” See Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 THE BELL
135
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For example, transacting parties sometimes cause negative externalities that
the law would want to deter. Or market failures challenge the assumption
that the parties have efficaciously negotiated towards the most efficient
outcome. As Schwartz and Scott state, “[t]hese objections should trouble a
unitary efficiency approach to the regulation of all contract types[.]”139
Indeed, these objections take center stage in public-private contracting.
In certain types of public-private contracting, uncontrolled agency
costs, misaligned incentives, costs akin to negative externalities, market
failures, and difficulty in specifying tasks lead to contracts that prioritize
cost savings over quality service provision. The effect is that the contract
imposes costs on service recipients that the contract price does not
reflect.140 Broadly speaking, there are two issues. First, particularly as to
contracts for soft government services, the government has strong
incentives to cut costs through outsourcing, but limited incentives to
guarantee good service. Second, even if the government were incentivized
to provide good service, it is difficult to align those incentives with those of
the private service provider.
A.
The Government Has Strong Incentives to Cut Costs, But
Limited Incentives to Guarantee Good Service
Private service providers are motivated to maximize profit.141
Usually when scholars debate the efficacy of privatization, they focus on
whether private sector firms pursue their profit maximization goal by
reducing service quality or by innovating to cut costs (in which case, service
levels may continue to be high).142 The answer to that question, at bottom,
is an empirical one to which there is no good answer.143 This subpart
focuses on a related but somewhat different question. Is the government
motivated to ensure high quality service provision? If the government is
not acting in ways that promote quality service provision (for instance

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 426, 426 (1976).
139
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, supra note 25 at 609.
140
Essentially, contracts are underpriced. At least that is the case putting aside potential
bargaining problems. Indeed, it is possible that even with the failure to internalize the cost
of poor service provision, that the contract is still overpriced if the government is a poor
negotiator.
141
Staunch supporters of privatization always point to the possibility that the private actor
will innovate and more efficiently provide comparable or even higher quality services, but
at bottom, few would dispute the primacy of profit maximization and cost-cutting goals for
the private actor.
142
Economic models on this issue are inconclusive. See, e.g., III. A Tale of Two Systems,
supra note 2 at 1877-78 (2002) (detailing how early economic models predicted
privatization would reduce both cost and quality, but recent literature argues that private
contractors may be motivated to innovate in a way that cuts cost but not service quality.).
143
Id., see also supra note 83.
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monitoring or switching providers when performance is poor), it follows
that quality service provision is significantly less likely to occur.
This subpart argues that the government lacks motivation to ensure
that private providers deliver high quality service when certain services are
outsourced because (1) its primary focus is on cost savings, and (2) market
forces and political forces that would normally align incentives between the
outsourcing company and the service recipient are lacking. 144
1.

Primacy of Cost-Cutting Goal

Privatization theory is primarily predicated on cost savings. It
argues that by subjecting government services to market forces and
competition, costs will be driven down.145 Scholars debate privatization’s
effect on service quality, but in the United States, most of the dialogue
about privatization centers on the potential for cost-savings.146
There is ample evidence that governments outsource in order to cut
costs. For instance, in a survey conducted in 2007, 87% of local
government respondents stated that their primary reason for choosing
privatization was an “attempt[] to decrease cost.”147 Fifty percent of
respondents said they were also motivated by “external fiscal pressures,
including restrictions placed on raising taxes.”148 The Reason Foundation
also confirms that state agencies have ramped up their use of privatization
as a means of cutting costs and balancing tighter budgets.149
The strong link between privatization and cost-cutting is
unsurprising, particularly because state laws and local ordinances often
144

As Martha Minow correctly notes, “with social services . . . accountability becomes
especially important but also recalcitrant, because those most directly affected by the
services or failures to provide services are politically and economically ineffectual.
Treatment of vulnerable populations simply does not work well in markets that depend
upon consumer rationality or upon political processes that demand active citizen
monitoring.” Minow, supra note 21 at 1262.
145
See Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Proper Scope of
Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1143 (1997)
(“Costs . . . are always lower under private ownership. Quality . . . may be higher or lower
under private ownership.”).
146
See Adrian Moore, Making Privatization Work for State Government (The Reason
Foundation, August 1, 2002), available at http://reason.org/news/printer/makingprivatization-work-for (“Here in the United States we have traditionally privatized services
for the money. . . .”); see also Dolovich, supra note 95 at 471-72 (“As for the state, in the
American context, the central aim is to save money on the cost of corrections.”); Joseph I.
Hallinan, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON NATION 164 (2001) (“The success of
private prisons. . . is driven by a single premise: They are cheaper than their public
counterparts.”).
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See Warner & Hefetz, supra note 1 at 16.
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Id.
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Leonard Gilroy and Harris Kenny, Annual Privatization Report 2011 (The Reason
Foundation, May 1, 2012), available at: http://reason.org/news/show/annual-privatizationreport-2011.
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require proof of cost savings prior to permitting privatization.150 For
instance, an Ohio statute requires that contractors “convincingly
demonstrate” that they can provide at least a five percent savings over the
cost of public service provision.151 Florida similarly requires that “[t]he
Department of Management Services may not enter into a contract or series
of contracts unless the department determines that the contract or series of
contracts . . . will result in a cost savings of at least 7 percent over the public
provision of a similar facility.”152
The same is often true at the local level. In California, one county’s
charter requires that the contracting agent determine that services be
provided “more economically and efficiently” by a private contractor than
by the government before it is permitted to enter into a contract. 153 Further,
contracting officers are sometimes required to award contracts to the lowest
responsible bidder.154
The rhetoric of government officials only confirms government’s
focus on the bottom line in making privatization decisions. In a news
conference last year, the elected official responsible for privatizing prisons
in Essex County, New Jersey, addressed his decision to free up beds in
county prisons to “rent” those beds to the federal government: “My chief
responsibility is to bring in revenue for this county, and we’ve done it very,
very well.”155 He also noted his motivation to “keep the taxes low.”156
While some states do require consideration of both cost savings and
quality in the privatization decision, the number of such states is small.157
150

Presumably these requirements are grounded in efforts to dissuade corruption and
cronyism.
151
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §9.06(A)(4) (West 2001 Supp.).
152
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 957.07(1) (West Supp. 2004); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-24104(c)(2)(B) (2004) (requiring contracting cost at least five percent less than the state’s
cost.).
153
See Giles v. Horn, 100 Cal. App. 4th 206, 214 (2002) (citing County Charter, article IX,
section 916, as amended in 1986).
154
See 81A C.J.S. States § 286 (citing Lewis & Michael, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv.,
103 Ohio Misc. 2d 29 (Ct. Cl. 1999) (Ohio); Balsbaugh v. Com. Dept. of General Services,
815 A.2d 36 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (Pennsylvania)). This requirement may lead to
underbidding, which usually equates to lower wages for workers and ultimately lower
quality of service. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 21; Goldberg, supra note 138 at (noting
problems with competitive bidding when quality is an issue).
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See Dolnick, supra note 46.
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Id., see also Lisa Belkin, Rise of Private Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1989, at A14 (“I'm an old state bureaucrat. . . . I don't have any
philosophies. If they can do it cheaper than the state can, more power to them.” (quoting
Bob Owens, internal auditor for the Texas Department of Corrections)); Nzong Xiong,
Private Prisons: A Question of Savings, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1997 at C5 (“I think as long
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Even where quality improvements are supposed to enter into the calculus,
they end up subservient to cost reduction because quality improvements are
difficult to contract for ex ante and difficult to monitor ex post.158
Relatively speaking, it is much easier to ascertain whether privatizing has
succeeded in cutting costs than whether it has succeeded in improving
quality.
2.

The Government Has Little Incentive to Effect Good
Service Where Service Recipients Have Limited
Economic and Political Power

There are other reasons that government actors lack adequate
incentive to care about quality. While some government actors may be
altruistic, or have public policy beliefs that cause them to promote high
quality services,159 rational, self-interested government actors have little
incentive—either economic or political—to promote high quality service,
particularly where the service benefits a small, disenfranchised segment of
the population.160
a)

The Economics

In the private sector, where there is a competitive market, customers
can affect the quality of product and service offerings. “[A] hypothetical
consumer chooses one product over another, drawing resources to the better
product and leading to the improved outcomes and efficiencies that the
market model promises.”161 Public-private contracting for soft government
services does not work in the same way.
An analogy to private outsourcing will help frame the issue.
Consider a hypothetical example where Macy’s, the department store chain,
outsources its website support operations to an Indian company, Tata
Consultancy Services (TCS).
Macys’ owners may have difficulty
controlling its managers and Macy’s may have trouble controlling TCS.
statutes require consideration of quality in addition to cost); see also Charles L. Ryan,
BIENNIAL COMPARISON OF “PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC PROVISION OF
SERVICES” REQUIRED PER A.R.S. § 41-1609.01(K)(M) (December 21, 2011),
available at:
http://www.azcorrections.gov/ARS41_1609_01_Biennial_Comparison_Report122111_e_v
.pdf.
158
The Government may also lack incentives to care about quality when it provides these
services directly. See Part III(A)(3). See also Part III(B)(2), infra, for a discussion of
difficulties in specification and monitoring.
159
Part IV(B) will further discuss appealing to social norms to yield better results.
160
These problems inhere in direct government service provision, as well, but see Part
III(A)(3) for a discussion of why outsourcing makes these problems worse and has the
capacity to make them better.
161
See Bach, supra note 65 at 300.
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These agency costs are mitigated by market forces that align profit
maximization goals and contract control mechanisms, such as specifying
tasks and monitoring.162
Macy’s and its customers will undoubtedly have divergent interests,
as well, but Macy’s is motivated in some real sense to keep its customers
happy. If its customers aren’t happy, they will choose to shop at a different
department store. Without customers buying its products, Macy’s cannot be
a profitable business. As long as Macy’s can convince TCS to keep its
customers happy, agency costs are not debilitating.
Now let’s carry the analogy through to public-private contracting
using the IBM-Indiana outsourcing example. There, Indiana is the
purchaser (like Macy’s). Indiana’s citizens are akin to Macys’ shareholders.
IBM, the service provider, is equivalent to TCS. And Indiana welfare
beneficiaries are essentially the customers.163 The same two agency costs
that occur in private outsourcing might also occur in the public-private
example.
Indiana’s citizens might have trouble controlling their
government, and Indiana might have trouble controlling IBM. But in
public-private contracting, there is an additional difficulty. Unlike the
interests of Macy’s and its customers, the interests of welfare beneficiaries
and Indiana citizens more generally tend to be diametrically opposed. This
is particularly true for soft government services, which affect only a small
portion of society.164 The public, for the most part, will want the
government to prioritize saving money (and reducing taxes) over providing
high quality prisons or welfare administration.165 Simultaneously, the
beneficiaries desire high-quality service and care little about the cost. Even
if the public is altruistic, or understands the negative implications for larger
society by these services failing, they may never know if private parties are

162

See Part III(B).
The beneficiaries are also citizens of Indiana, so to complicate matters, they are part of
both the “shareholders” group and the “customers” group.
164
Note that the soft vs. hard distinction is particularly important in the “serving two
masters” context. With hard services that affect the entire public, the entire public has an
interest in quality service provision. If the government contracts for a hard service and
quality is poor, it is likely that the larger public will become aware of the issue, and that the
collective public will be able to use its political power to force the government to affect
change.
165
Of course this is not always true and arguably should not be true. When prisons are
poorly run and people escape, that affects the general public. And when people do not
obtain access to Medicaid benefits, they cannot pay for health care, and that ultimately
imposes larger costs on the system. Consider the larger debate about the Affordable Care
Act on this point. However, as a matter of relative preferences, most non-service
beneficiaries will care more about their taxes being as low as possible, and less about the
quality of service offered to welfare applicants. Even further, the general public may not
know when prisons have poor security or the welfare system functions poorly.
163

Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private Contracting

28

running low quality prisons or poorly administering welfare benefits.166
They will, however, know if their taxes go up.
The “customers” in public-private contracting lack the economic
power that they have in the private analog. For one, the government is not
motivated by gaining market share.
And “customers” (welfare
beneficiaries) have no market for services.167 If they don’t like how IBM is
administering the system, there is no other choice. As such, the service
recipients have almost no economic power to force the government to care
about their interests.168 The next question, then, is whether they can instead
invoke their political power.
b)

The Political Story

Politically, governments are accountable, at least in theory, to the
publics at whose behest they serve. But the public-private contracting
scenario begs the question of which “public” the government serves.
Essentially, the government must serve two masters whose interests are at
odds.169
Because the larger public wields more political power than the
service beneficiaries, the government will feel added pressure to prioritize
cost savings over quality service provision. Indeed, groups like criminals
and poor people decidedly lack political power. Felons cannot vote and are
generally powerless to effect change.170 And for a variety of reasons, lowincome people are less likely to vote than their wealthier counterparts, and
even less likely to mobilize politically as a group.171 This problem is
166

The press coverage of the IBM-Indiana and CEC-New Jersey contract failures are the
exception, not the rule.
167
See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra
note 2, at 110, 112-13 (“the competitive process that supposedly renders private enterprise
more efficient than public agencies cannot be effectively implemented in many cases
because there is no nongovernment market for the product in question.”).
168
This is also a problem with direct service provision. See Part III(A)(3).
169
See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 24 at 272 (“Government is accountable to the public, but
which public? Public officials, for example, are accountable to the general public, although
difficult and subtle questions can arise as to the relevant “public” to which officials must
respond.”).
170
Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in
Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 824-826 (1990) (inmates powerless to effect change);
Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in THE TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 282, 287-88 (Lester M. Salamon ed.,
2002); VI. One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1939 (2002) (felons lose the right to vote for life).
171
Thom File and Sarah Crissey, Voting and Registration in the Election of November
2008 (July 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf
(reporting than in the 2008 election, low-income people, minorities and renters were less
likely to register and to vote than their wealthier, white, home-owning counterparts).
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unique to soft government services. If a private service provider failed to
pick up a city’s garbage, everyone would notice and everyone would care.
Not so with soft government services.
There are other reasons, as well, that government actors tend to lack
the (political) incentive to ensure quality service provision. For instance,
government actors are unlikely to be in office when poor service starts to
matter politically.172 One of Governor Christie’s first responses to the poor
halfway house publicity in New Jersey was to blame the prior
administration.173 And some individual government actors will make
decisions motivated by opportunities after public employment, to boost
their fame or reputation, or to increase chances for reelection or
promotion.174
This Article does not discount that government actors are boundedly
rational and therefore will at times be motivated by notions of altruism or
other social norms. Indeed, the more government actors who are motivated
in altruistic ways, perhaps the more likely projects are to succeed. But
nonetheless, there is a systematic bias based on the economic and political
incentives of government actors to favor contracts that cut costs and
sacrifice quality.
3.

Why This Is A Contracting Problem

So far, many of the reasons provided for the government’s lack of
incentive to provide high quality “soft” services would apply equally to
direct government service provision as they do to government outsourcing.
When a government directly runs a prison or administers welfare benefits, it
too will have limited incentive outside the altruistic, public service ones, to
provide quality service. Outsourcing to private providers is supposed to
ameliorate those problems. And yet, the government’s lack of incentive to
ensure high quality service pervades the public-private contracting
relationship, as well.
But the foregoing analysis begs an additional question: why does the
contracting relationship matter? Does outsourcing lead to worse service
provision than government-service provision?
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See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 739-40
(2010); Nicholas Miranda, Concession Agreements: From Private Contract To Public
Policy, 117 YALE L.J. 510, 523-24 (agreements tend to last longer than the official’s term
in office).
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Statement from Governor Chris Christie on Halfway House Oversight and
Accountability (June 18, 2012), available at:
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552012/approved/20120618a.html.
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Immunity after Privatization, 8 S. CT. ECON. REV. 103, 111, 124 (2000).
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The empirical evidence on this is both preliminary and mixed.175
Mixed results are unsurprising, in part because quality is difficult to assess
and comparisons between public and private enterprises (consider prisons
more specifically) are difficult to fairly make.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that contracting out does
decrease the incentive to provide good service even beyond what has
already been addressed. For one, there are occasions when poor service
provision does come to the attention of the general public and poor service
provision affects the broader public. In the New Jersey halfway house
example, it was reported that inmates were escaping and committing violent
crimes. When something like that happens, the government gains some
political insulation from the fact that the private service provider erred and
not the government directly. As Jody Freeman argues, the government can
point its finger at the private entity and avoid political backlash.176
It is hard to know how often this occurs and with what success, but
at the very least, there are instances of states attempting to put blame on the
private contractor rather than accept responsibility. The Indiana-IBM case
is a good example. Although the court’s final order in that litigation
blamed, in part, Indiana’s role in designing a faulty welfare administration
system, Indiana’s rhetoric post-decision continues to point the finger at
IBM:
We believe the court’s view that IBM's concededly bad
performance did not materially breach the contract is wrong,
and cannot be squared with the overwhelming evidence of
poor performance. . . . IBM’s own senior executive called it
175

See supra note 83; Nathan Newman, Privatizing in the Dark: The Pitfalls of
Privatization & Why Budget Disclosure is Needed, with a 50-State Comparison of
Privatization Trends (December 2007), available at:
http://www.progressivestates.org/files/privatization/PrivatizationReport.pdf (noting lack of
reliable quality data, but finding “at least one analysis of privatization of state and local
services over the last 20 years found the majority of such projects failed because of
deteriorating quality of service.”). See also Dolovich, supra note 95 at 504-05 (citing a
study in Oklahoma finding over a three-year period that “private prisons recorded more
than twice as many incidents as public ones. Similar findings were also made in an earlier
study commissioned by the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC).”); cf., Francois
Melese, Privatizing Public Hospitals: A Win-Win for Taxpayers and the Poor, The Reason
Foundation (Nov. 2005); A Tale of Two Systems, supra note 2 at 1875-76 (noting difficulty
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an ‘abomination,’ and IBM executives repeatedly admitted
the State had good reasons to be dissatisfied.”177
Second, while the prior subparts discussed why self-interested
government actors have little incentive to provide good service, it is
possible that the prevalence of altruistic actors is greater amongst
government employees than private actors. While government actors may
not have the economic or political incentive to provide quality service,
scholars have argued that they are more inherently likely to provide quality
service than private actors who are highly motivated by maximizing
profit.178 Also, in the private sector, workers’ bonuses are often tied to the
overall profitability of the company. Individual private sector workers who
are self-interested will therefore be motivated to cut costs and maximize
profit. Government employees may have the same motivations (in
particular by having to stick to tight budgets), but in general, government
employees are not financially rewarded by cutting costs. This is one of the
arguments as to why the private sector may be able to deliver services more
cheaply. But it is also a reason that private service providers might be even
more motivated than government actors to provide low quality service.
Finally, even if both government service provision and private
service provision suffer equally from low incentives to provide high quality
service, nonetheless, contracting out opens the door to contract-based
solutions that align incentives to improve quality. In this sense, contracting
provides an opportunity.179
4.

Implications

The government is motivated to cut costs and lacks adequate
motivation to care about the quality of service being provided. There are
arguably many reasons to care about this result from a fairness and public
policy perspective. But so too is the result undesirable from an economic
perspective because the government is entering into contracts with private
parties that impose costs on non-party service recipients—costs that the
contracting parties do not bear.
Technically, this may not be a negative externality because the
service recipients are members of the public who are also the principal to
177

Jon Murray, Indiana Must Pay IBM $12M for Canceled Contract, Judge Rules, THE
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (July 18, 2012), available at
http://www.governing.com/news/state/mct-indiana-must-pay-ibm-for-canceledcontract.html; see also Dan McFeely, Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles Passes Blame
over License Renewals, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Feb. 22, 2003), available at 2003 WLNR
10904930 (“Under fire for botching the license plate renewals for more than 200,000
Hoosiers, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is changing its original story and shifting the
blame from the agency to a private contractor.”).
178
See, e.g., The Contracting State, supra note 5.
179
Id.
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the government as agent. But regardless of the terminology, the effect is the
same. If Buyer B and Seller S enter into a contract to produce a widget for
$100, efficiency theory assumes that $100 is an efficient price that has made
neither party worse off. If S and B pollute the environment as a result of
their transaction, and the pollution negatively affects non-parties to the
contract, then $100 does not reflect the true cost of the transaction. Instead,
the cost of the transaction is really $100 plus the cost of the pollution. The
parties’ transaction should account for that cost. This is the logic behind
environmental legislation and other forms of regulation that force parties to
internalize costs. Because the government and the private service provider
do not account in their contract for the cost of poor service provision, their
contract is essentially underpriced.
But these failures between the government and the beneficiaries are
not the only ones that trouble public-private contracts. The next subpart
discusses the problems between the government and the private service
provider.
B.

Government Difficulties in Effectuating Good Service

The second major problem in public-private contracting is that even
were the government motivated to obtain high quality service from its
contractor, it is difficult to accomplish that goal using traditional tools to
control agency costs. Economic theory predicts that market forces will
motivate agents to perform well. Further, agency theory predicts that
contract specification and monitoring will align party incentives. But the
realities in public-private contracting are different.
1.

Lack of Market Competition

Law and economics theory predicts that competition fosters
efficiency. Market competition forces agents not only to control costs, but
also to deliver quality services.180 If a private provider fails to deliver
quality service, the contracting party will choose another service provider at
contract renewal.181 Because agents want future business, they will provide
high quality services.182 Agents are also concerned about reputational
effects in the marketplace. Therefore, they are incentivized to perform well.
180

See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 890, 918 (2010) (“More generally, it can be argued that a competitive market operates
as a powerful constraint that makes direct accountability less critical.”).
181
See Jeffrey D. Greene, CITIES AND PRIVATIZATION. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall 2002); John D. Donahue, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION (New York: Basic Books,
Inc. 1989) (emphasizing the “cardinal importance of competition” in privatization, and
stating that “most of the kick in privatization comes from the greater scope for rivalry when
functions are contracted out, not from private provision per se).
182
Rubin, supra note 180 (“Firms that compete for government contracts will necessarily
strive to achieve the goals that the agency sets so that the agency will renew the contracts
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Whereas private outsourcing agreements generally benefit from the
agency cost reducing effect of market competition, certain types of public
outsourcing contracts do not benefit, at least to the desired extent.
Governments face shallow markets for privatizing certain services.183 In the
Indiana example, IBM and its subcontractors submitted the only bid for its
welfare outsourcing project.184 When Arizona privatized its state welfare
system, only one company offered a bid.185 In New Jersey, there was only
one bidder for a contract to run a 450-bed immigrant detention center.186
The list of outsourcing contracts entered into after a single bid, or a low
number of bids, is a long one.187
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that market forces fail to force high
levels of performance in government outsourcing contracts as efficiency
theory would predict.188 True market conditions require that both buyers
and sellers have options in contracting partners and that there be relatively
low barriers to entry in the marketplace.189 There is always at least one

or grant them other contracts in the future.”)
183
Elliot Sclar, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF
PRIVATIZATION 92 (Cornell University Press 2000) (“In privatization debates, beneficial
competition is treated as analogous to a common and hardy lawn weed that sprouts
whenever its seeds touch the earth. A more accurate analogy would be to a rare orchid,
whose beauty is undoubtable but only blossoms under very special conditions.”).
184
Final Order, supra note 78 at 6-7.
185
Stevenson, supra note 21 at 90-92 n.37.
186
Sam Dolnick, Reversing Course, Officials in New Jersey Cancel One-Bid Immigrant
Jail Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/nyregion/essex-county-reverses-decision-ondetention-center-bid.html.
187
In Connecticut, Colonial Cooperative Care, Inc. was the only bidder for its contract to
determine eligibility for disability-based cash assistance. See generally, Stevenson, supra
note 21 at 90-92.
188
Christopher Hartney and Caroline Glesmann, Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations
Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S. (May 2012), available at:
http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf (lack of
competition “also contributes to the likelihood of inadequate performance once a contract
is executed. If a particular industry only has a few providers, the government’s ability to . .
. it is difficult to effectively replace one provider with another, if the need arises.”).
189
Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, MICROECONOMICS 271-73 (7th ed. 2009)
(“The inability of any given buyer or seller to affect the price of an item is one of the
hallmarks of a perfectly competitive market.”); Rubin, supra note 180 at 918 (2010) (“Ideal
competition occurs when the government is one of many buyers for a product that has
many sellers.”); Stevenson, supra note 21 at 90–91; Jocelyn M. Johnston & Amanda M.
Girth, Contract management in thin markets: Examining transaction costs and contract
effectiveness, available at:
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/conferences/pmrc/Files/Johnston%20Contract
%20management%20in%20thin%20markets%20Examining%20transaction%20costs%20a
nd%20contract%20effectiveness.pdf (“Three or more bidders seem to be widely accepted
as indicative of some minimal level of competition.”); David Lowery, Consumer
Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH
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other seller option in the sense that the government could choose to take a
service back in house, but that option, even assuming it is a realistic one,
does not make a market “competitive.” Much of the proof of shallow
competition is anecdotal, nonetheless, studies have confirmed that
competitive markets are lacking. For instance, a 2007 survey of city and
municipal governments found that, on average, there are fewer than two
provider options for city service contracts.190 State governments also
experience thin markets as they increase their reliance on contracts for
service delivery.191
Not all types of outsourcing see low levels of competition. This is
another point in the analysis where the distinction between hard and soft
government services matters.192 For one, soft services require higher
relationship-specific investments because there tends to be no equivalent in
the private, commercial market. There are no commercial owners of
prisons or administrators of public benefits.193
Also, the buyer market (governments) is usually much smaller than
it is in private outsourcing markets, dampening interest in the seller side
market to develop expertise. 194 For instance, it has become clear that there
is demand on the private buyer side for outsourced call center services.
Therefore, companies are incentivized to develop this expertise. There is
AND THEORY

137-172 (1998) (arguing that quasi-markets often fail to meet efficiency
objectives due to in part to market failure).
190
See Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Service Characteristics and Contracting: The
Importance of Citizen Interest and Competition, THE MUN. Y.B. 19-27 (2010).
191
For a good summary of studies (survey and interview methods) on competition in local
and state-level outsourcing, see David M. Van Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in
Contracting for Social Services. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 63(3): 296-315 at Table
1 (2003). See also Mildred E. Warner & Bel. Germa,. Competition or Monopoly?
Comparing Privatization of Local Public Services in the US and Spain, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 86(3): 723-735 (2008); Jocelyn M. Johnston & Barbara S. Romzek,
Social Welfare Contracts as Networks: The Impact of Networks Stability on Management
and Performance, ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY 40(2): 115-146 (2008).
192
David M. Van Slyke, Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the
Government-Nonprofit Social service Contracting Relationship, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 17(1): 157-187 (2007) (“There are significant
differences among contracted services, such as social services and refuse collection, in
terms of the market and political ideology supporting or opposing alternative service
delivery arrangements, the level of market competition that exists, and the ease of defining,
measuring, and observing outputs and outcomes.”); see also Donohue, supra note 2
(supporting outsourcing of commodity or hard services and not custom or soft services
because private entities can be as inefficient as the government in a noncompetitive
market.)
193
Rubin, supra note 180 (“There are certain activities of government, however, that have
no market analogue, either because no one would buy them or because no one would sell
them. Punishment is an example of the first, and welfare benefits (free money) are an
example of the second.”); see also Davidson, supra note 2 at 271.
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The buyer side market is short of a monopoly because there are many states and
counties who may desire private prisons. Nonetheless, the market is necessarily limited.
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enough work to go around. In contrast, the demand for private prisons is
not nearly as robust.
Second, it typically requires a very large, resource rich company to
take on the sorts of projects that fall into the “soft” services category. 195 A
“mom and pop” local business owner cannot realistically bid to administer
welfare benefits for the entire state of Indiana or to operate a 1000-bed
halfway house. Therefore, “[t]he size and complexity of the programs
significantly limit the number of new entrants to the market, . . . stifling the
only source of competition[.]”196
In addition, because of the nature of the services being provided and
the requirement of large relationship-specific investments up front,
contracts tend to be long-term. Once a provider wins a contract and
provides a service for a long period of time, it is even harder for other
providers to compete.197 Buyers often find the costs of changing suppliers
problematic, such that they exercise the option to switch only in extreme
circumstances. The first party to make the investment required to
administer a complicated government program often gains quasi-monopoly
advantages. 198 One study in Los Angeles observed that agencies typically
renewed their contracts for family preservation programs over many cycles,
and that over time, the private providers began to look and function like
monopolists.199
Third, even in markets where there are multiple participants to start,
vertical consolidation tends to happen over time. Consolidation permits
advantage through economies of scale. And where there is only one buyer,
consolidation decreases risk of losing out on a lucrative contract.200
Corruption and cronyism in public-private contracting can also narrow
markets.
195

This is not always true. For instance, there are smaller contracts to be had for social
services, but this paper focuses on the problems that inhere in larger contracts for soft
government services, which are pervasive.
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Stevenson, supra note 21 at 91.
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Rubin, supra note 180 at 919.
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Walsh, supra note 129 at 35.
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Elizabeth A. Graddy, and Bin Chen. Influences on the Size and Scope of Networks for
Social Service Delivery, JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
16: 533-52 at 548-49 (2006) (“Thus, just as we find in franchise arrangements, this
structure could create long-term contracts that begin to look like monopolies.”).
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See Barbara S. Romzek, and Jocelyn M. Johnston, State Social Services Contracting:
Exploring the Determinants of Effective Contract Accountability, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REVIEW 65(4): 436-449 (2005); Mark Schlesinger, Robert Dorward & Richard Pulice,
Competitive Bidding and States’ Purchase of Services: The
Case of Mental Health Care in Massachusetts, JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND
MANAGEMENT 5: 245-63 (1986) (describing the multiple forces encouraging consolidation
among contractors for mental health services in Massachusetts, such as economies of scale
in both provision and bidding); Bach, supra note 65 at 299-301; Gilman, supra note 21 at
642.

Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private Contracting

36

Whereas effective markets can help overcome principal-agent
problems in private outsourcing, public-private contracting markets are thin.
Markets therefore do not help constrain opportunistic behavior on the part
of the agent as efficiency theory would suggest.201
2.

Specification and Monitoring Problems

In addition to markets constraining agency costs, agency theory also
suggests that agency costs arising between a buyer and its service provider
should be controllable by clearly specifying performance requirements and
benchmarks and then monitoring to ensure compliance. 202 These control
mechanisms can work well in private outsourcing, however, they are
difficult to implement in public-private contracting.
a)

Specification Difficulties

A common complaint amongst government officials is that it can be
difficult to “writ[e] clear contracts with specific goals against which
contractors can be held accountable.”203 This is particularly true in
contracts for soft government services:
No matter how careful the drafter, some tasks are difficult to
specify in contractual terms (for example, delivering quality
health care or providing a safe environment for prisoners).
For many important services and functions contractual
incompleteness is inevitable. No contract can be specific
enough to anticipate any and all situations that a private
provider might encounter.204
The point is probably intuitive, but almost by their definition, soft
government services are complicated endeavors.205 Particularly where tasks
involve direct involvement with clients, they may be unpredictable and
difficult to evaluate.206
Sometimes the choice to try to define specific performance metrics
or outcome-based goals is problematic in and of itself. This is because
service providers will work to comply with the requirements of the contract,
201
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but will ignore other elements of service quality or adherence to broader
program goals. This is called “shirking.”207
John Donahue explains the problem with reference to education:
The problem is that higher math test scores, fewer dropouts,
more frequent recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance, and
other such measurable results are not all that we expect of
our schools. “Education” also includes subtler factors that
are hard to specify, harder still to monitor, and this limits the
ability of a school district to easily choose the most attractive
bidder among education contractors.208
When it is difficult to specify quality, it only contributes to
incentives for service providers to cut costs at the expense of quality
because in doing so, they may not technically be violating the terms of the
contract.209 A related problem is that focusing on outcomes can cause
profit-seekers to “cream,” or select those who are easier to serve or more
likely to be successful, avoiding the harder cases. Accordingly, it is
difficult to force compliance with overall service provision goals solely
through more detailed requirements or even outcome-based rewards.210
Even if goals could be adequately specified, monitoring presents
additional hardships and costs.
b)

Difficult and Costly to Monitor

In the absence of adequate market competition and defined
performance standards, agency theory predicts that adequate monitoring is
another potential substitution to force good performance. And yet sufficient
monitoring is seldom seen in public-private contracting.
A 2007 study found that fewer than half of the responding municipal
governments reported doing any monitoring. 211 And those who did monitor
reported evaluating fewer aspects of contractor service than in the same
survey conducted in 2002.212 Also in 2007, an analysis of municipal data
on new contracting out and contracting back in (returning to direct
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government service provision) found that contracting back in was primarily
associated with problems with monitoring. 213
Governments lack the incentive to monitor because doing so is
costly and may undermine the cost savings that prompted privatization in
the first place. While it is also costly in private outsourcing, the cost is
more justifiable in that context where the satisfaction of the ultimate
customer motivates the outsourcing party to monitor the service provider.
In the private example, if customers are not satisfied, it will negatively
affect the profitability of the outsourcer. The same is not true in
government outsourcing, where beneficiaries do not pay for the service and
have limited ability to force the government to internalize the costs of poor
service. As a result, governments tend to under-monitor.214
Also, as a practical matter, monitoring is difficult, particularly for
soft government services that are large, complicated, and removed from the
public eye.215 While government officials can make unannounced visits to
private prisons, it would be difficult to adequately observe the goings on at
entire institutions. Monitoring also requires expertise, which government
officials often lack.216
The difficulties of monitoring private contractors only encourages
governments to focus even further on cost savings rather than ensuring
quality of service. This move is self-perpetuating, particularly if you
believe that companies cut costs by lowering service quality. Governments
essentially end up rewarding companies that choose not to invest in quality
service.
In sum, the mechanisms that economic theory predicts will control
agency costs and align incentives between the government as principal and
the private service provider as agent, are lacking in public-private
contracting. It is not surprising, then, that public-private contracts result in
poor quality service provision.
John Donohue has suggested that where tasks are difficult to
specify, quality is difficult to assess, and there is no competitive market, it
is simply not efficient to outsource those services.217 He may be correct.
But governments are outsourcing these precise services. In light of that
213
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reality, the next Part discusses potential contract-based solutions to better
align both the interests of (1) the government and the service beneficiaries,
and (2) the government and the private service provider.
IV.
Proposing A Contract-Based Solution: A Mandatory Duty That
Parties Act In Furtherance of the Public Interest
Part III detailed a number of systematic biases that tend to cause
government outsourcing agreements to prioritize cost savings over quality
service provision. Governments and private service providers fail to
internalize the costs they impose on service beneficiaries. Therefore,
putting bargaining problems to the side, contracts will often be underpriced.
This Part suggests a potential solution to force the parties to account for the
cost of poor service provision. Namely, the transacting parties should be
subject to a mandatory duty to act in furtherance of the public interest, and
service beneficiaries should be able to sue to enforce breach of the duty.
One of the most significant problems with public-private contracting
for soft government services is that neither the private service provider nor
the government has a great enough incentive to ensure quality service
provision.218 Relatedly, governments have difficulty controlling private
service providers who are motivated by maximizing profit and not by
adherence to the overall program goals.
Typically, efficiency theory assumes that mandatory restrictions on
contracting parties are inefficient, because parties cannot bargain around
them when the mandatory rules impose inefficiencies. However, as
mentioned earlier, scholars have recognized exceptions. For instance,
Robert Gertner and Ian Ayres have argued that regulation in the form of
mandatory rules may be justified to protect non-parties to the contract who
cannot adequately protect themselves.219 And it is generally agreed that
“[t]he inefficiency of the market when externalities are present can justify
restrictions on private contracts.”220 These requirements will often be met
in cases of public-private contracting, because the people who receive the
services will typically be unable to make governments internalize their
needs. Therefore, a contracting restriction may be justified.
Contract law can force the parties to internalize the cost of poor
service provision. It can also align the goals of the parties. Requiring the
parties to act in furtherance of the public interest, both in entering into
contracts intended to benefit the public and in performing these contracts,
will serve these ends.
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What Would the Public Interest Standard Require?

The proposed public interest standard would require both
contracting parties to take steps to provide service that is in the best
interests of the public. The “public interest” currently only plays a limited
role in contract doctrine.221 After all, contract law is conceived of as
“private law.” But a public interest requirement is also not completely
without precedent. Government contracts tribunals have recognized that
“because of its size, power, and potential ability to manipulate the market
place, the Government may have obligations of fairness beyond those of the
ordinary citizen.”222 And there is a doctrine of contract interpretation under
which a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred when
choosing among reasonable meanings of an agreement.223
The concept of the “public interest” is also prevalent in certain
regulatory regimes. For instance, the “public interest doctrine” is a central
tenet of communications law.224 The doctrine is said to originate from
English common law, where there was a principle that “businesses affected
with the public interest” take on certain social responsibilities enforceable
by the law.225 There are two historic justifications for the doctrine—that
certain businesses exhibit a degree of monopoly control226 and that they
“hold out” service to the public at large.227 These justifications are similar
to those that would prompt a public interest standard in public-private
contracting.
There are undoubtedly objections to a public interest duty. The first
is that it is difficult to define.228 At bottom, the “public interest” standard
221
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should prevent the parties from providing poor service to the intended
service beneficiaries who are not parties to the contract.229 Perhaps the
easiest way to define the requirement is by reference to examples given
earlier in this Article. For one, a private jail or halfway house failing to
provide adequate security to prevent inmate escapes or to protect inmates in
custody would be in breach of the public interest standard. Or in the
welfare-to-work context, failing to serve all applicants and instead
prioritizing the easier-to-resolve cases would be a breach of the public
interest standard. Accordingly, the term “public” in the standard should be
construed broadly, but with particular emphasis on the segment of the
population most directly affected by the contract (i.e. prisoners or welfare
beneficiaries in the examples). Further, the “public interest” standard
should require that the contracting parties equally serve all those who the
service is intended to benefit.
A related objection is that vagueness may give the courts too much
power to decide disputes along ideological lines.230 But this is not
crippling. The purpose of inferring the public interest duty is not to
encourage litigation where courts would be forced to parse the meaning of
the term.231 Rather, it is to force better conduct from the parties in
negotiating and performing the contract. Parties who are required to
promote the public interest will, in theory, be incentivized to behave better
and to provide better service in order to avoid litigation. 232 Also, it is rare
for contracts such as these to result in litigation.233 And there are other
contracts, and fraud to assure that goods and services will move to users who are willing to
pay the highest price for them.” Shell, supra note 125 at 500.
229
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poor service provision to the segment of the public at whom the service is aimed.
Therefore, transacting parties cannot satisfy the duty to further the public interest by
appealing to the fiscal interests of taxpayers alone without addressing the need for quality
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contract doctrines that defy precise definition. Good faith and fair dealing
is one such example.234 Nonetheless, the good faith requirement is thought
to serve the purpose of preventing opportunism (although it is also the
subject of much critical literature).235 The concept behind the public
interest requirement would be similar but not identical. This is particularly
so because the good faith requirement applies to the transacting parties,
while the public interest duty reaches out to protect third-parties to the
contract.
Another potential objection is that imposing a mandatory duty
would likely increase the cost of the contract. Providing better service (and
also increasing potential liability) will be costly to the service provider. The
service provider, in turn, is likely to try to pass on at least some of that cost
to the government. In a sense, though, this is the desired result. Parties to
the agreement should be forced to internalize the cost of poor service
provision. If the transaction costs more, then that is what efficiency
dictates. If the duty increases the cost of the contract such that it is no
longer efficient to contract out, that is an indication that contracting out was
not the efficient choice in the first instance.236
Another potential objection is the mandatory nature of the duty,
which the next subpart considers.
B.

Why A Mandatory Duty?

The duty to act in furtherance of the public interest should take the
form of a mandatory duty that is implied in all government outsourcing
contracts, just as the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied
in all contracts.
Economically-oriented scholars generally disfavor
mandatory or immutable rules. The traditional justification for opposing
mandatory rules, discussed in more detail in Part II(A)(4), is that such
“rules are inconsistent with the commitment to party sovereignty,”237 as
well as to overall efficient contracting.
And yet there are instances where mandatory rules are necessary.
For instance, if the contract imposes third-party effects, or is subject to
other market failures, the parties’ choice of a contract term “might no longer
least to the extent that third-parties can afford to bring suit.
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See Robert S. Summers, The Conceptualization of Good Faith in American Contract
Law: A General Account, in REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & SIMON WHITTAKER
(edited), GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 119, 196 (2000) (noting that
no unifying meaning of good faith can be devised).
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Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through S 1983, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1449, 1504-05 (2009) (“If it is too expensive for a private company to perform public
functions in a way that adequately safeguards federally protected rights, then perhaps those
functions should be left to the government to perform.”); see also Donohue, supra note 2 at
49.
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coincide with the rule that would in fact be most efficient.”238 Such is the
case in public-private contracting.
Instead of using mandatory rules, we could consider using default
rules that remain in force unless parties decide to contract out of them. But
this solution is troubling in the privatization context because parties would
likely contract around the default, just as they explicitly disclaim third-party
beneficiary suits.239 Permitting abrogation would defeat the purpose of
forcing the parties to internalize the cost of poor service provision. A
mandatory rule would not be necessary, of course, if government
contracting agents choose to voluntarily insert the clause into their
contracts. The government has the bargaining power to do it. The concern
is whether they have the incentive to do so.240
Assuming that the duty must be mandatory, in a sense, it can be
justified in similar terms to the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which is
equivalent to a prohibition on opportunistic behavior. The difference is that
the public interest duty would prevent opportunistic behavior that
negatively impacts third-parties, not parties to the contract.
In addition, just as good faith is said to “save parties the cost of
negotiating and drafting express contractual provisions that prevent
opportunistic behavior[,]”241 so too would the public interest duty save the
238

Richard Craswell, CONTRACT LAW: GENERAL THEORIES 3 (1999); see also id. at 618
(rules should be mandatory only when “the parties’ contract creates an externality or is the
product of market failure.”); Cooter and Ulen, supra note 116 at 295 (a perfect contract
requires no regulation, but imperfect contract may require mandatory rules, a form of
regulation). There are other ways to respond to externalities and market failure. For
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litigation.
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parties the cost of bargaining for specific contractual provisions to define
what behavior would be in the best interests of the public. In this vein, the
concept of the public interest standard works particularly well in tandem
with the suggestion made in the following subpart that contracts should be
less specified. Without specification, one concern is that service providers
will take advantage and act opportunistically. 242 However, requiring parties
to act in furtherance of the public interest minimizes that risk.
C.

Enforcement

Another potential constraint of the public interest duty is that it may
not effectively deter the imposition of costs on third-parties unless the threat
of litigation is real. Put another way, if neither the government nor the
private service provider were incentivized to provide quality service under
the old regime, neither will be incentivized to sue to enforce the duty under
the proposed regime. Therefore, this subpart suggests that members of the
public for whose benefit the service was being provided—and who are
harmed when service provision is poor—should be permitted to sue as
third-party beneficiaries for breach of the public interest duty.243
The standard (commercial) third-party beneficiary rule provides that
a party who is not a signatory to a contract can sue to enforce the contract in
limited circumstances. Typically, the non-party must establish that the
contracting parties intended to benefit him or her through the contract.244
Because parties to a contract can create a right in a third person, the thirdparty beneficiary rule is said to enhance judicial economy by permitting a
direct action against the promisor.245
But the standard for achieving third-party beneficiary status to a
government contract is more stringent than the commercial contract
standard. It is not enough for a third party to show that the purpose of the
government contract was to benefit the public. Rather, the terms of the
government contract must directly provide for liability to the third-party.246
The heightened standard is usually justified on the basis that the
government typically contracts on behalf of the entire public. Therefore,
almost anyone could allege standing to sue for breach of contract. The
typical example that is often given is that the government might contract
with a private provider to heat a public building. If the heat goes out and a
242
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member of the public catches a cold, he should not be permitted to sue the
heating company. Put another way, the stricter rule is thought to prevent
private parties who contract with the government from limitless
litigation.247 It avoids the situation where private parties will choose not to
enter into contracts with the government because of the risk of litigation.
Under current law, then, it is very difficult for a third-party to gain
standing to sue under a government contract. This is particularly so where
there is an express clause disclaiming the intention to benefit third-parties,
as is often the case in such contracts. “No third-party beneficiary” clauses
are almost always controlling.248
But the objections to a broader right of third-party suit under
government contracts do not hold water, here. First, contracts for the
provision of soft government services generally do not affect the entire
population, but rather a narrower segment of the population. 249 The
majority of the population will never be an inmate in a prison or apply for
welfare benefits. The segment of the population that is most affected by
these services typically lacks financial resources (at least in the welfare and
prison examples). Therefore, the onslaught of litigation pictured by
proponents of the stricter rule is unlikely.250
Second, permitting third-party suits will increase the cost of the
contract. However, that increased cost reflects the true cost of the bargain
between the parties. If the increased price means the contract is no longer
efficient for the parties to enter into the contract, then the contract should
not be formed in the first place.251
The current system (absent the mandatory duty) benefits companies
who reduce quality to reduce cost. Essentially, companies who underbid
and then perform poorly win out over companies that would bid more
accurately and then perform better. Permitting third-party suits would
ultimately benefit companies providing high quality services. Companies
usually get sued when they harm service beneficiaries. To the extent that
the mandatory duty imposes costs, it exacts the greatest cost increases on
the poorest performers.252
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In sum, a contract mechanism can force the parties to internalize the
cost of poor service provision and prompt better quality service from the
private provider. A mandatory duty to act in the public interest will align
the objectives of the government and the private provider and force them to
consider the cost of poor service provision on beneficiaries.
V.

Conclusion

Privatization advocates urge that introducing market competition
into government services will result in both cost reduction and better quality
service. They argue that private providers have expertise, are better able to
innovate, and are unconstrained by government bureaucracy. But while
privatizing may reduce costs, it also often results in poor quality service
provision.
Public law scholars have explored this problem, but their analysis is
incomplete because it does not consider these issues from a commercial
law, and in particular an efficiency theory, perspective. Doing so sheds
light on the systematic reasons for these failures. First, the government
does not have adequate incentive to force the service provider to provide
quality service. The government is caught serving two masters—the service
recipients who want high quality service and the rest of the public that
prefers that less be spent on such services. The service recipients have little
economic or political power. Therefore the government is incentivized to
prioritize cost cutting above all else. Laws requiring that government
outsourcing cut costs over government provision enforce this result.
Government actors are also not likely to be in office long enough to see the
effects of poor service, and even if they are, they can point their finger at
the private service provider for errors.
Second, even if the government were adequately concerned about
providing high quality service, it is difficult to control the private service
provider where competitive markets are lacking, tasks and desired outcomes
are difficult to specify, and monitoring is both difficult and costly. As a
result, the contracting parties tend to impose a cost on service beneficiaries
in the form of poor service provision. There are inadequate mechanisms to
force the parties to internalize this cost.
Because these unregulated contracts are inefficient and impose costs
similar to negative externalities, contract restrictions are necessary. This
Article suggests that a mandatory duty to further the public interest should
be imposed on the parties to government outsourcing contracts. Those who
are harmed by poor service provision should be permitted to sue for breach
as third-party beneficiaries to the contract. Although state and local-level
outsourcing agreements suffer from the effects of poor markets and agency
costs, these problems can be addressed and abated using contract
mechanisms.

